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CARDOZO AS TORT LAWMAKER
Gary T. Schwartz*

In his tort opinions, was Cardozo a lawmaking judge? Was he, as
the title of Professor Kaufman's article claims, a "paradigmatic
lawmaker?"' If Cardozo was a lawmaker, what was the quality and
character of his lawmaking? Obviously, if a judge makes wise law, the
judicial lawmaking process looks much more attractive than if the
judge makes bad law, or even mediocre law.
From The Nature of the JudicialProcess,2 we learn Cardozo's deliberated views. Judges do make law, Cardozo reported-and his affirmation of this at the time evidently made his Storrs Lectures a
sensational event. Yet, according to Cardozo, when judges make law,
they generally do so only in the "gaps" or "interstices" brought about
by precedent.3 This suggests one point, and poses one related inquiry.
The point is that judicial lawmaking, if limited to filling in the gaps,
has less practical importance than it otherwise might; for the prior rulings which themselves provide the framework for those gaps are
deemed to be generally immune from judicial reconsideration.
A related question concerns the frequency with which individual
cases do indeed fall within gaps and interstices. After all, adherents to
early versions of Critical Legal Studies advanced a theory of radical
indeterminacy, pursuant to which no case, analyzed carefully enough,
could authentically be seen as governed by precedent. 4 Under such a
view, even if it is conceded that judges make law only within gaps,
every case contains enough of a gap to give the judge the leeway to
choose what result he wants to reach (though the reasons he gives for
such a result-his holding-may well be significantly constrained by
precedent). However, more recent writers-critiquing the radical indeterminacy thesis-have affirmed a theory of moderate indeterminacy, pursuant to which, for many cases, precedent does indeed yield
* William D. Warren Professor, UCLA School of Law.
1. Andrew L. Kaufman, Benjamin Cardozo As ParadigmaticTort Law Maker, 49 DEPAUL L.

REV.281 (1999).
2. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
3. Id. at 113-14.
4. See, e.g., David Kairys, Law and Politics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.243 (1984).
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clear results, though for many others gaps can be recognized.5 The
relevant passage in The Nature of the Judicial Process suggests that
Cardozo would regard even the moderate indeterminacy thesis as
coming on somewhat too strong; according to Cardozo, creativity is
required of the judge in a percentage of cases that is "not large indeed, and yet not so small as to be negligible."' 6 In a later presenta-

tion, Cardozo indicated that in no more than 10% of all cases is there
7
any uncertainty about the proper result.
The body of Cardozo's tort opinions are roughly in line with Cardozo's extrajudicial statements about judicial lawmaking. As a New
York judge, in no tort case that I know of did Cardozo overrule precedent. 8 Indeed, on occasion, he followed precedent even when he
thought it reached an awful result. In Schloendorff v. The Society of

New York Hospital9 and Hamburger v. Cornell University,10 for example, Cardozo affirmed and applied the doctrine of charitable immunity, even though he privately advised his fellow judges that he found
the doctrine "foolish, antiquated, and unjust."" It "ought to be abolished, ''1 2 he indicated-but abolition was not within the judicial function. Insofar as he followed precedent where it was clear even when
he thought it was quite wrong, Cardozo comes across as a tepid
lawmaker. Indeed, in worker injury cases, Cardozo applied the de-

fenses of assumption of risk 13 and the fellow-servant rule' 4 without
even pausing to ask the question whether the defenses themselves
5. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

AND LErAL THEORY 448 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996); Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL.
L. REV. 283 (1989).
6. CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 165.
7. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 60 (1924).

8. As a Justice on the United States Supreme Court, Cardozo's opinion in Pokora v. Wabash
Railway Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934), is seen by some as overruling Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v.
Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927), insofar as Pokora treated as a jury issue whether the plaintiff had
been contributorily negligent in not getting out of his car as he approached a railroad crossing.
Yet Cardozo was careful in Pokora to say he was not overruling Goodman. Pokora, supra at
102-06. And Cardozo was correct in this. The leave-the-car language in Goodman not only was
seemingly dictum, but also was conditioned by "if" and "although" clauses that made it considerably less than a firm standard. Goodman, supra at 70.
9. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). In this case, which involved a hospital, Cardozo seemed enthusiastic about charitable immunity.
10. 148 N.E. 539 (N.Y. 1925). In this case involving a university, Cardozo seemed somewhat
skeptical about the immunity rule.
11. Cardozo's report is quoted in ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 252 (1998).
12. Id.
13. See Dougherty v. Pratt Inst., 155 N.E. 67 (N.Y. 1926) (perfunctory opinion holding that
the worker assumed the risk as a matter of law).
14. See Fitzgerald v. O'Rourke Eng'g Constr. Co., 105 N.E. 111 (N.Y. 1914) (perfunctory
opinion).
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were right or wrong. In another worker injury case, Cardozo applied
the New York rule that placed the burden of proof on the issue of
contributory negligence on the plaintiff, even though that rule was out
15
of line with the more general practice nationwide.
Cardozo was tepid, moreover, in somewhat related ways. When in
tort cases he agreed with the majority's result but possibly disagreed
with its reasoning, he withheld his own views. There are no important
Cardozo concurring opinions; he was a solid team member. Nor, in
fact, are there any Cardozo dissenting opinions in tort. When he regarded the majority's result as mistaken, he noted his dissent but did
not write an opinion. This happened even when the majority evidently exalted form over substance, 16 and even in cases raising impor17
tant and interesting issues such as tort liability for prenatal injuries.
On several occasions, however, Cardozo did encounter issues that
were free of precedent (at least in New York) and therefore provided
him with lawmaking opportunities. H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer
Water Co.18 and Ultramares Corp. v. Touche 19 are good examples of
this-cases in which Cardozo did indeed make law. In dealing with
Moch and Ultramares,I regard it as obvious that the judge's "lawmaking" includes holdings that withhold liability as well as holdings that
impose liability. Too often, terms such as "lawmaking" and "creativity" are employed or defined in ways that give those terms a distinct
pro-liability bias.
20
As a New York judge, only in Hynes v. New York CentralRailroad
and MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.21 did Cardozo really lean on or
manipulate precedent somewhat in order to achieve the results he desired. Hynes recognized a somewhat ad hoc limitation to an otherwise
general rule of the landowner's nonliability to trespassers. MacPherson endorsed a new pro-liability standard, despite considerable contrary indications in the case law.
15. McCabe v. Rosoff Haulage Co., 166 N.E. 343 (N.Y. 1929).
16. See, e.g., Kettel v. Erie R.R., 122 N.E. 885 (N.Y. 1919). This case is discussed in KAUFMAN, supra note 11, at 254-55.
17. See Drobner v. Peters, 133 N.E. 567 (N.Y. 1921). At this point, I should make clear that
the cases discussed in the previous paragraphs were unknown to me until I learned of them from
Professor Kaufman's thorough and admirable account. Given the selection criteria that
coursebooks employ, they necessarily omit opinions like Schloendorff and Hamburger. Those
coursebooks thereby convey to readers a serious misrepresentation of Cardozo's overall
position.
18. 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
19. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (rejecting accountants' liability in negligence to non-privity
plaintiffs, though supporting liability for fraud, broadly defined).
20. 131 N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1921).
21. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
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How should we size up opinions such as Hynes and MacPherson? I
agree with Professor Kaufman 22 that Professor Richard Weisberg
errs2 3 insofar as he seemingly regards Hynes as representative of Cardozo's general approach; Hynes is, to the contrary, an unusual episode
for Cardozo. I also agree with Professor Kaufman that the common
law background for MacPherson, especially in New York, was much
more confused and ambiguous than has been generally supposedthough I still find that MacPherson endorses a standard that is much
more solidly in favor of liability than anything that had preceded it.24
Winterbottom v. Wright,25 as Cardozo correctly pointed out,26 did not

involve a manufacturer defendant, but rather a defendant operating
under a service contract, who apparently had failed to repair. The
defendant's negligence evidently taking the form of a failure to act,
Winterbottom may well be an affirmative duty case, which means that
the contract does have relevance by way of understanding the scope of
the defendant's undertaking. Moreover, the prior record of the New
York Court of Appeals did contain precedents imposing liability on
28
the supplier of a scaffold 27 and a steam-driven coffee urn.
Stepping back and looking at Cardozo's general approach to tort
law, it can properly be said that Cardozo accepted the doctrine of negligence liability-in each of its two parts. Part one is this: when a
defendant is negligent, he should bear liability. Part two is: when a
defendant is not negligent, he should generally not be liable. For Cardozo, accepting the negligence liability doctrine was not at all a matter
of being bound by precedent. As Professor Kaufman persuasively
shows,2 9 Cardozo was entirely comfortable within the framework of a
22. See KAUFMAN, supra note 11, at 281.
23. Richard H. Weisberg, Judicial Discretion, or the Self on the Shelf, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
105, 108 (1988).
24. Statler v. George A. Ray ManufacturingCo., 88 N.E. 1063 (N.Y. 1909), for example, found
liability appropriate because a steam-driven coffee urn was an "inherently dangerous" product
which becomes "imminently dangerous" if negligently constructed. Id. at 1064-65. But in his
MacPhersonopinion, Cardozo rejected the distinction between "inherently dangerous" and "intrinsically dangerous" as a "verbal nicet[y]." 111 N.E. at 1055.
It can be noted, however, that the rationale supplied by Cardozo in MacPherson had indeed
been articulated in a prior intermediate-court New York opinion. See Kahner v. Otis Elevator
Co., 89 N.Y.S. 185, 188 (App. Div. 1904). "[A]lthough a machine may not be in its nature inherently dangerous, yet, if it is made so by the neglect of a manufacturer having notice and knowledge that it is to be used by others than the purchaser,... such manufacturer is liable ... because
of that negligence." Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling without opinion. Kahner v.
Otis Elevator Co., 76 N.E. 1097-98 (N.Y. 1905).
25. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. Ch. 1842).
26. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1054.
27. See Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882).
28. See Statler, 88 N.E. at 1063.
29. KAUFMAN, supra note 11, at 310.
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negligence-based liability system; he accepted as a given its basic correctness. Unlike Holmes, he was in no way intrigued by such strict
liability examples as Rylands v. Fletcher,30 and the New York blasting
cases. 31 Nor did he display any interest in the enterprise liability writings which were then emanating from legal centers such as Yale, and
which were implicated in emerging workers' compensation programs.
If Cardozo accepted the negligence liability rule as a given, did he
contribute to an illumination of the negligence doctrine? The answer
32
to this question is affirmative, and the key case is Adams v. Bullock.
Professor Kaufman treats this case as simply an instance of a no-liabil33
ity holding in a case involving a trolley company as the defendant.
In fact, however, Cardozo's opinion in Adams merits substantial attention (and it is indeed highlighted in Robert Rabin's co-authored
torts coursebook). 34 In Adams, Cardozo noted that trolley companies, and also power companies, rely on high-strung energized electric
wires. 35 In each situation, the risk of someone coming into contact
with such a line at any particular out-of-the-way location is quite
small, but still was more than zero. A relevant distinction, however, is
that power companies can provide safety through the acceptable precaution of insulating the power line. The precaution of insulation is
not, however, available to a trolley company. All it can do is bury the
electric line underground-and the burden of such a precaution Cardozo deemed to be excessive. 36 Hence the proper result in Adams
was a directed verdict for the trolley company defendant.
Adams is an excellent opinion. What it implies-and very usefully
illustrates-is a balancing approach to negligence, an approach that
balances the magnitude of the foreseeable risk against the burden of
risk prevention. Yet while I admire the opinion, my admiration is limited by two considerations. The first is that in Adams the balancing
approach to negligence is only implicit. It would take a far more creative judge-namely Learned Hand 7-to make that approach explicit
in an important judicial opinion.3 8 Secondly, and despite Professor
30.
31.
32.
33.

19 L.T. 220 (1868).
E.g., Booth v. Rome, W. & O.T. R.R., 35 N.E. 592 (N.Y. 1893).
125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919).
KAUFMAN, supra note 11, at 281.

34. MARC FRANKLIN & ROBERT RABIN, TORT LAW AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 31 (6th ed. 1996).

35. See Adams, 125 N.E. at 94.
36. Id.
37. Cardozo and Hand were reasonably good friends. See KAUFMAN, supra note 11, at 148,
153-54.

38. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); see also Moisan v.
Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949); Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940).
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Kaufman's suggestion that Cardozo was a "pragmatic" judge,39 there
is not a word in Adams v. Bullock-indeed, not a hint-about what
the goals or purposes of a negligence liability regime might be.
Whether the objective of negligence law is deterrence, or instead corrective justice,40 is a question that Adams does not address, nor in any
way cast light upon. In accepting a negligence rule as in essence innate-in finding himself entirely at home with such a rule-Cardozo
simply declined to ask himself what the rule itself was all about.
Cardozo's two most famous tort opinions involve not so much the
negligence rule as such, but rather the extent of liability within a
negligence system. These two are of course MacPherson and Palsgraf
v. Long Island Railroad.41 Judge Posner ventures the view that
Palsgrafis the only judicial opinion to be reproduced in every torts
coursebook. 42 My own estimate is that Posner is wrong-and that
MacPherson is presented as universally as Palsgraf. Let me then address these two dramatic opinions, beginning with MacPherson.
In that case, the manufacturer's "privity"-based argument stipulated that the manufacturer did owe a negligence obligation to the
retailer, but owed no such obligation to any other party. 43 Keep in
mind that in many of the earlier cases involving claims of privity, the
defendant had individually fabricated the product in question. Keep
in mind, as well, that in many of those cases the defendant had sold
the product to a party who could be expected to be the product's ultimate owner. MacPherson, however, involved the privity argument in
the context of mass production, pursuant to which manufacturers distributed products throughout the nation, by way of a network of retailer intermediaries. 44 I am unaware of any prior case in England or
New York in which the privity doctrine had shielded a mass-producing
manufacturer from liability for an injury suffered by the ultimate consumer. Indeed, in this mass production context, the manufacturer's
argument in favor of tort-liability-based-only-on-privity was highly
unattractive, 45 perhaps even a reduction to absurdity. Accordingly,
Cardozo's decision to reject it-and reject it firmly-was quite justi39.
40.
Law,
41.

See KAUFMAN, supra note 11, at 218-19.
The choice between the two goals is discussed in Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort
Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1801 (1997).
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).

42. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 42 (1990).

43. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
44. See id.

45. It is interesting to note how courts prior to Cardozo's MacPherson ruled on the issue of
the negligence liability of auto manufacturers. Liability was affirmed in Olds Motor Works v.

Shaffer. 140 S.W. 1047 (Ky. 1911). Liability was rejected-but by a divided court-in Cadillac
Motor Car Co. v. Johnson. 221 F. 801 (2d Cir. 1915). In MacPherson itself, when the case first
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fled. To use the idiom of Chicago movie criticism, on balance the
MacPherson opinion justifies an evaluation of thumbs up.
Yet despite that evaluation, in important ways, the MacPherson
opinion can be seen as superficial. First of all, the opinion fully accepts the manufacturer's position that there was no contract relationship between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer.
Interestingly enough, this is a position that is rejected by a modern
economic analysis, which treats products liability as a situation in
which there is a meaningful, even if somewhat indirect, bargaining re46
lationship between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer.
The manufacturer, after all, designs a product so that it includes a set
of attributes that will appeal to consumers; the manufacturer, by establishing the product's wholesale price, essentially determines the
product's retail price range; and the manufacturer calls the product to
the attention of consumers through extensive advertising. The consumer then responds to the overall package prepared for him by the
manufacturer by buying the product. When I purchase a loaf of packaged bread, I know what I like;4 7 I then shop at whatever nearby market carries that product. When I need a car (the product involved in
MacPherson), I figure out first what model I want, and only then begin considering the dealer with whom I might do business. Broadly
defined, then, there may well be an important though implicit kind of
"privity" between the manufacturer and the consumer in a case such
as MacPherson. Yet this is a possibility that Cardozo does not bring
up. Most of the time, he limits himself to stating that the manufacturer had knowledge that the product would be transferred from the
retailer to some other party.48 The most he is willing to say is that the
manufacturer sold to the retailer knowing that the retailerintended to
sell to another party, the consumer. 49 The more important pointthat the manufacturerwas itself seeking to reach that consumer-is a
point that Cardozo does not really make.
But having affirmed that there is in a meaningful way a contract
relation between the manufacturer and the consumer, I can go on to
the next point, which is that the presence of this relationship may
weaken the argument for tort liability rather than strengthen it. After
reached the Appellate Division, that court had ruled in favor of liability. MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 138 N.Y.S. 224 (App. Div. 1912).
46. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 97-106 (2d ed.

1989).
47. Currently, Roman Meal Honey Wheat Berry; this is for the ritual of my breakfast toast.
48. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
49. Id. Here Cardozo's analogy is to the seller of a scaffold who knows that the buyer of the
scaffold expects to turn it over to his employee for use.
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all, the manufacturer is in a position to offer the consumer an express
warranty as to product quality. Moreover, by the time of MacPherson, the law had developed an implied warranty claim which the consumer could assert at least against the retailer, if not against the
manufacturer. 50 Moreover, if the consumer collects against the retailer on this implied warranty claim, the retailer will no doubt seek
indemnification from the manufacturer. The consumer's recovery,
then, is essentially financed by the manufacturer. Why, then, is this
implied warranty remedy not adequate for purposes of compensating
the consumer and imposing the burden of liability on the manufacturer? This has to be regarded as an important issue to take into account in evaluating the MacPherson holding. Yet this is an issue that
the Cardozo opinion does not discuss. 51 The brief for the plaintiff in
MacPherson had argued that it would not be satisfactory for the law
to rely on the consumer's remedy against the retailer, because that
would "surely" lead to a "circuity of action" as the retailer sought
"recourse over the" manufacturer. 52 This brief went on to argue that
by imposing liability directly on the manufacturer, the law can properly elevate "substance" over "form. '53 The plaintiff may have been
right in all of this. But even if so, the Cardozo opinion's neglect of this
range of issues renders the opinion significantly incomplete, and
makes the liability issue considered in MacPherson appear excessively
stark or dramatic.
As for Palsgraf, even though its universality in coursebooks is
matched by MacPherson,it is Palsgrafthat has come to symbolize the
entire experience of being a law student-at least a first-year law student.5 4 When the torts course is offered in the fall semester, I typically
reach Palsgrafin October. I tell my students that when they return to
50. A few years after MacPherson, Cardozo dealt with the implied warranty doctrine in
Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co. 139 N.E. 576 (N.Y. 1923). In MacPhersonitself, the defendant's brief
to the New York Court of Appeals stated that "[a] vender owes a duty to his vendee, and for a
failure of that duty, an action may be brought upon the contract or upon the warranty, expressed
or implied." Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 10, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050
(N.Y. 1916). In his own brief, the plaintiff's counsel expressed his "belief" that the plaintiff could
have successfully sued the retailer. Respondent's Brief at 22, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
51. It is true that the implied warranty doctrine would not confer rights on parties unrelated
to the product purchaser, such as the innocent bystander. But in MacPherson, Cardozo himself
declined to consider whether the bystander can bring a negligence claim. 111 N.E. at 1053.
52. Respondent's Brief, supra note 50, at 22-23; but see id. at 48-49 (suggesting that implied
warranty liability might not extend beyond the cost of replacement and repair).
53. Id. at 22-23.
54. See, e.g., Marly Swick, Moscow Nights, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1990, at 59. This recent
short story involves a young couple that break up, with the woman then enrolling in law school
(at UCLA).
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their families for Thanksgiving vacation, it is likely that several of
them will encounter a friend or relative who, having learned they are
in law school, will ask them: "What do you think of that Palsgraf
case?" Every year, at the end of Thanksgiving vacation, several students come knocking on my door to tell me that my prediction has
indeed been borne out.
Palsgraf,then, undeniably exerts a fascination. What can be said
about the case? I myself regard as quite correct Cardozo's result, de-

nying liability. I also regard as correct his opinion's emphasis, in
reaching that result, on the scope of the foreseeable risk. Despite
these elements of agreement, I still regard Cardozo's opinion as a misfortune. 55 While I generally thrive in teaching the torts course, I do
not look forward to the day on which Palsgrafis the agenda.5 6
My complaints about Palsgrafare several. One concerns the finding
of negligence. In the case, two employees had helped a passenger
who was attempting to board a moving train. The passenger dropped
a package-which turned out to contain explosives. 57 The resulting
explosion knocked over a scale some distance away, injuring the plaintiff who was standing near the scale. The jury found the railroad negligent, and the Appellate Division affirmed this finding. 58 In doing so,
the Appellate Division assumed that the railroad's negligence consisted of unreasonably endangering the passenger's own safety by
shoving him towards the train when the railroad should instead have
been discouraging him from boarding a moving train.5 9 For whatever
reason, the Cardozo opinion rejects the Appellate Division's understanding. According to Cardozo, there was no risk at all to the passenger; the railroad's negligence consisted merely of unreasonably
endangering the contents of the passenger's package. 60 Yet so characterized, the negligence of the railroad is so peculiar, so artificial, and
When [she] answered on the second ring, he was surprised. "It's Saturday night," he
said. "I didn't think you'd be home."
"In law school there's no such thing as a Saturday night." She sounded impatient.
"I'm in the middle of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad. This better be good."
Id. at 60.
55. Another scholar who finds Cardozo's Palsgrafunsatisfying is Bill Powers. See William
Powers, Jr., Thaumatrope, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1319, 1334 (1999).
56. One point is that the Palsgrafopinions are generally set forth in coursebooks at considerable length. It is therefore necessary to spend a full class hour teaching the case. If, as I believe,
the yield of the case is slight and the confusions in the case numerous, this turns out to be an
unproductive hour.
57. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 225 N.Y.S. 412, 413 (App. Div. 1927).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928). "The man was not injured in
his person nor even put in danger. The purpose of the act, as well as its effect, was to make his
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so unreal as to render Palsgrafa terrible vehicle for discussing the
limitations on the liability of any genuinely negligent defendant.
Secondly, the Cardozo opinion, having hinted at a theory that
would exclude liability for unforeseeable outcomes, then limits that
theory to the particular problem of the unforeseeable plaintiff. Indeed, the Cardozo opinion explicitly assumes, if only for the sake of
argument, that if a foreseeable plaintiff suffers an altogether unforeseeable injury, the plaintiff can secure a recovery. 61 This arguendo
assumption would apply to plaintiffs' claims in many important proximate cause cases.62

Assume, for example, a slightly modified version of Judge Keeton's
well-known hypothetical. 63 The defendant leaves a package of poison
on a kitchen shelf; this is negligent, because a person such as the plaintiff could mistake the poison for food, and in consuming it, suffer injury. In fact, the can of poison is located near a pipe on the shelf.
Even though the defendant had no reason to appreciate this, the proximity of can and pipe creates a risk of the can's explosion; in fact, the
can does explode, and in doing so, injures the plaintiff. While in such
a case the defendant's overall conduct is in some sense the cause of
the plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff has not been injured because of the
negligent aspect of that conduct. The injury is not part of that foreseeable risk which renders the defendant's conduct negligent in the first
place. Under Judge Keeton's theory of proximate cause, the plaintiff
would hence be denied recovery. 64 Yet under Cardozo's arguendo as-

sumption, the plaintiff would evidently have a winning claim.
All of this prompts criticism. If one accepts (as I do) Judge Keeton's proximate cause analysis, then the right result is to deny liability
person safe. If there was a wrong to him at all, which may very well be doubted, it was a wrong
to property interest only, the safety of his package." Id.
61. Id. at 101. "We may assume, without deciding, that negligence, not at large or in the
abstract, but in relation to the plaintiff, would entail liability for any and all consequences, however novel or extraordinary." Id.
To make things even more complicated, Cardozo then introduced an arguendo assumption
into his arguendo premise. The foreseeable plaintiff who suffers an unforeseeable injury might
not be able to recover if the injury involves a different "interest" than the interest foreseeably
threatened by the defendant's negligent conduct. Id.
62. Under this arguendo assumption, the plaintiff (quite without regard for the factor of directness) would be able to recover in In re Polemis, 90 L.J.K.B. 560 (1921), because the defendant's negligence in that case foreseeably threatened harm to the plaintiff's vessel. A recovery
could also be granted to the plaintiff in The Wagon Mound (No.)) (Overseas Tankship (U.K.))
Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., [1961], 1 App. Cas. 388 (P.C. 1960) (appeal taken from
Australia). In this case, the defendant's negligence foreseeably threatened harm to the plaintiff's
dock.
63. See ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 3 (1963).
64. Id. at 9.

1999]

CARDOZO AS TORT LAWMAKER

for unforeseeable injuries. While the Cardozo opinion moves somewhat in this direction, it nevertheless imposes a major limitation on
that idea that confounds analysis-and that makes Palsgrafan inadequate vehicle for discussing the scope-of-the-foreseeable-risk proximate cause rule that Keeton recommends. At least in my course, that
discussion must await later English opinions such as The Wagon
66
Mound (No. 1)65 and Doughty v. Turner Manufacturing Co.
Also, the Cardozo opinion, having narrowed the issue to that of the
unforeseeable plaintiff, then indicates that the doctrine of proximate
cause has nothing to do with the case. That doctrine is indeed "foreign" to the case 67-which instead turns exclusively on the issue of
duty. All of this invites further criticism. By introducing a duty concept that is supposedly quite separate from a proximate cause concept,
the Cardozo opinion prompts a long dissent by Andrews that discusses duty before it turns to proximate cause. Andrews' broad definition of duty makes it seem as though he is very strongly pro-liability.
But when (and if) attention is finally focused on Andrews' treatment
of proximate cause, his version of proximate cause turns out to be
much less pro-liability than one might have assumed. While that version of proximate cause would indeed support liability in Palsgrafitself, it is also generally consistent with the denial of liability in Ryan v.
New York Central Railroad68-and it would as well be unstructured
and arbitrary in a way that makes that version highly unattractive. If,
as Andrews states, proximate cause depends not on "logic" but rather
on "expediency," "practical politics," "convenience," and "a rough
sense of justice," 69 then how in the world does a trial judge instruct
the jury? Likewise, how does an appellate court determine whether a
trial judge has ruled correctly? In any event, the analytic deficiencies
and the anti-liability implications in Andrews' account of proximate
cause are obscured by his more dramatic and unambiguous pro-liability pronouncements on the duty issue. 70 These are pronouncements
that could have been avoided altogether had Cardozo defined the issue properly as one of proximate cause rather than of duty-and had
65. The Wagon Mound (No. 1), 1 App. Cas.
66. 1 All E.R. 98 (1964). Doughty is indeed a difficult case because the injury that happened
is reasonably close to the injury that could have been foreseen.
67. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
68. 35 N.Y. 210 (1866). In discussing the Ryan problem, Andrews indicated that "[wie may
regret that the line was drawn just where it was, but drawn somewhere it had to be." Palsgraf,
162 N.E. at 104.
69. Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 103.
70. Judge Posner notes the deficiencies in Andrews' treatment of proximate cause. POSNER,
supra note 42, at 45-46. But he does not appreciate how those deficiencies receive reduced
attention because of Andrews' dramatic discussion of duty.
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the case been fully debated in proximate cause terms. In fact, the two
opinions join issue on the duty issue, a question which I regard as an
irrelevancy. Worse yet, given Cardozo's emphasis on duty, there is
simply no joinder on the issue of proximate cause. 71
To make a bad situation worse, the Cardozo opinion is replete with
grandiloquent quasi-philosophical rhetoric that captures but also con-

founds the reader. 72 There is not a word in the opinion that counts as
genuine legal philosophy-that deals with the purpose or functions of
the tort system. 73 In his review of the Kaufman biography, Professor
Goldberg calls Cardozo "conceptual," and applies this evaluation to

the Palsgraf opinion. 74 I think he is right in this. But Goldberg is
wrong in referring to a "pragmatic conceptualism. '75 Rather, the Cardozo conceptualism is pretentious and essentially arid. 76
In defense of Cardozo, about all one can say is that roughly sixty
years later, Professor Weinrib was able to find a certain corrective jus77 However,
tice quality in Cardozo's relational reasoning in Palsgraf.
71. In Palsgrafitself, the proximate cause argument against liability is that the defendant, in
causing the package to drop, could not have foreseen that a scale some distance away would fall
in a dangerous manner. Given this basic argument, the point that the plaintiff was an unforeseeable victim is derivative and redundant.
Consider the following hypothetical. At 4:00 p.m., the defendant negligently creates a hazard
on a street in Beverly Hills that endangers those who encounter it. At that moment, the plaintiff
is more than an hour away in Long Beach, where she lives and works. Indeed, it has been more
than a year since the plaintiff has come to Beverly Hills. At 4:30, however, the plaintiff receives
a phone call from an acquaintance visiting in Beverly Hills, suggesting they get together for
dinner. At 6:00, the plaintiff, while driving in Beverly Hills, encounters the danger, and suffers
injury.
If Cardozo's Palsgrafopinion requires that the plaintiff be specifically foreseeable at the time
of the defendant's negligent act, that requirement has obviously not been satisfied. Accordingly,
Palsgrafwould deny the plaintiff a recovery-which would be a very unattractive result. Perhaps, in such a factual situation, Palsgrafs "foreseeable plaintiff" requirement can be interpreted
as referring to "anybody who encounters the hazard." But so interpreted, a "foreseeable plaintiff" test adds nothing to a "foreseeable injury" standard; it is-again-derivative and
redundant.
72. For Posner's discussion of the "bluff" involved in Cardozo's inflated rhetoric, see POSNER,
supra note 42, at 45.
73. As the Kaufman book usefully shows, in Palsgraf Cardozo drew on a prior discussion
among Restatement Reporters. KAUFMAN, supra note 11, at 290-93. I find this discussion similarly discouraging, because of a lack of any concern about what the ultimate goals are of tort
doctrine, and, more generally, the tort system. But at least that discussion proceeds by way of an
interesting give-and-take, and in straightforward language. There is nothing in it that resembles
the pretentious overconfidence of Cardozo's Palsgrafopinion.
74. John C.P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1456-57 (1999).
75. Id. at 1461-62.
76. Even Goldberg concedes that Palsgrafis on the "technical" side. Id. at 1469.
77. See ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 159-64 (1995). For similar reasoning in
a recent article that speaks approvingly of Cardozo's duty analysis, see Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998).
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corrective justice reasoning can also be found in the proximate cause
rule that Judge Keeton has persuasively recommended. By requiring
a meaningful causal connection between the negligent aspect of the
defendant's conduct and the harmful consequences suffered by the
plaintiff, that rule strengthens the relationship between the defendant
and the plaintiff's injury in a way that supports a relational7 8 or corrective justice understanding of tort law.
Overall, then, I confer on Palsgrafan evaluation of "thumbs down."
Undeniably, no coursebook can afford to leave Palsgrafout. The case
is too imposing, and has been too widely discussed to justify any such
omission. Still, my view is that Cardozo in this instance has disserved
the tort community.
I can conclude my Comment with this observation. In his own
Comment, Judge Keeton has offered the view that, while he never met
Cardozo personally, he feels that he knows Cardozo well through his
judicial opinions. 79 I find Cardozo more elusive than this. The Kaufman biography answers certain questions about Cardozo, but leaves
unanswered other questions, and suggests new questions of its own.
Indeed, the more I learn of Cardozo, the more uncertain I am as to
who he is and what he stands for. Why the judge who was so creative
in Hynes should have accepted and applied a charitable immunity rule
that he found atrocious, I do not know; nor do I know why Cardozo
was a law reformer on manufacturer liability yet a complacent conservative on employer liability. But just as some mystery is the spice
of life, it likewise is a spice of legal history. In this regard I do not find
that Cardozo's elusiveness is in any important sense unsatisfactory.

78. See KEETON, supra note 63, at 82-83.
79. Robert E. Keeton, Andrew Kaufman's Benjamin Cardozo as Paradigmatic Tort

Lawmaker, 49
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